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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 13, 2003, the United States military captured former Iraqi
dictator Saddam Hussein.' Saddam's capture brought the prospect of peace
in a region scarred by decades of violence, oppression, and widespread
human rights abuses. 2 President George W. Bush offered this message to the
Iraqi people in the days following Hussein's capture:
You will not have to fear the rule of Saddam Hussein ever again. All Iraqis
who take the side of freedom have taken the winning side. The goals of our
coalition are the same as your goals-sovereignty for your country, dignity
for your great culture, and for every Iraqi citizen, the opportunity for a
better life.
In the history of Iraq, a dark and painful era is over. A hopeful day has
arrived. All Iraqis can now come together and reject violence and build a
new Iraq.
3
Iraq took the first significant step towards President Bush's vision on
June 28, 2004, when the U.S. military relinquished power to an interim Iraqi
government. 4 The interim government will maintain power in Iraq until
general elections are held in early 2005. 5
1 Susan Sachs, The Capture of Hussein: Ex-Dictator; Hussein Caught in Makeshift
Hide-Out, Bush Says 'Dark-Era'for Iraqis is Over, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2003, at Al.
The once all-powerful leader of Iraq, Saddam Hussein was arrested without a fight by the
American military, who found him submerged in an eight-foot hole at a farm near Tikrit.
Id. The soldiers found him haggard, dirty, and disoriented after nine months of eluding
capture. Id.
2 See id.
3 Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Addresses Nation on the Capture of
Saddam Hussein (Dec. 14, 2003), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031214-3.html (emphasis added).
4 Todd Richissin, Cautious Iraqis Not Ready to Celebrate, BALT. SUN, June 29,
2004, at 1A, available at LEXIS, News Library, Balsun File.
5 73 Days and Counting; June 30 Deadline; How to Move Iraq Toward Democracy,
NEWSDAY, Apr. 18, 2004, at A56.
527
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The obstacles facing the interim government and the future elected
leaders in Iraq are daunting.6 Among other things, Iraq's new government
will have to continue American efforts in rebuilding civilian and government
infrastructure, raising an army, maintaining peace in the war-ravaged and
ethnically diverse cities throughout Iraq, facilitating private business,
developing a national economy, and, finally, developing social policies on
everything from education to health care.7 This will take time, discourse, and
debate.
The focus of this Note, however, is on an issue the Governing Council
and future Iraqi leaders must confront without delay: What should the people
of Iraq do with -members of Saddam Hussein's regime still residing- in Iraq
who are responsible for human rights abuses? A critical aspect to Iraq's
peaceful transition is how the new Iraqi government addresses the human
rights atrocities committed during Saddam's reign and deals with the
perpetrators of those abuses.8 Only a month after Saddam's capture,
6 See, e.g., Phil Reeves, The Capture of Saddam Hussein: Euphoria Today, but
Difficulties Lie Ahead, INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 15, 2003, at 6, available at LEXIS,
News Library, Indpnt File. In the wake of Hussein's capture, the United States and the
interim Iraqi government will face several challenges if they hope to offer the 25 million
Iraqi citizens "the prospect of a peaceful future." Id. For example, the U.S. must establish
a new Iraqi security force which can competently defend the new governing authority
from well-trained guerrilla cells and suicide bombers. Id. The U.S. and the Iraqi
Governing Council must also devise a means for creating a transitional government that
appeases the Shi'a majority and allays the Sunni minority's fears of being excluded from
power. Id. These examples represent only a small part of the daunting tasks that lie ahead
for the emerging leaders of Iraq. See also John F. Bums, A Region Inflamed: Violence; At
Least 143 Die in Attacks at Two Sacred Sites in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2004, at Al.
7 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Attacks Force Retreat From Wide-Ranging Plans for Iraq,
WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2003, at A01. The U.S. plans to hand over power to a provisional
Iraqi government on July 1, 2004. Id. Before it does so, U.S. officials are scrambling to
put the necessary physical, financial, and governmental infrastructure in place to assist
Iraq in this transition. Id.
The U.S. administrator of Iraq, Paul Bremer, and his deputies are "focused on
forging compromises with Iraqi leaders and combating a persistent insurgency in order to
meet a July 1 deadline to transfer sovereignty to a provisional government." Id. Among
other things, U.S. officials are attempting to assist Iraq in privatizing Iraq's 48 state-
owned businesses, writing an Iraqi Constitution, overhauling "a national food rationing
program that was a cornerstone of Hussein's welfare state," rebuilding hundreds of
schools, and rebuilding and expanding the country's electrical, water, and sewage
systems. Id. U.S. officials believe these are necessary steps for a stable transition to a
sovereign Iraq. Id.
8 The Iraqis are anxious to start the criminal proceedings against Saddam Hussein
for his human rights abuses. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Iraqi Planners Hope to Start Trial by
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thousands of demonstrators marched in cities throughout Iraq, chanting
"Saddam is a war criminal, not a POW. Execute Saddam."9 The Iraqi people
seek retribution against Saddam and his government, and the new
government must find the best way to deliver it.10
Saddam Hussein should and will face prosecution for his war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and other human rights violations. I I However, the
more complicated question for Iraq will be how to address the less significant
villains of Saddam's Iraq. The U.S. military has had as many as 12,000 Iraqi
prisoners of war in custody. 12 A majority of those prisoners may have
participated, at some level, in the massive human rights violations committed
during Saddam's rule.13 In addition, many Ba'ath Party members,
Republican Guard soldiers, and Fedayeen militiamen remain at large in
Iraq. 14 The new Iraqi government must find a solution for bringing these
Spring, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2003, at AO1. One Iraqi Governing Council member,
Mowaffak Rubaie, who had been arrested and tortured by Hussein's secret police, stated,
"We can't delay this. It's an integral part of national reconciliation. We can't begin the
process of reconciliation until we show the people that the man at the top, who was
responsible for unspeakable terror, is brought to justice." Id.
9 Shia Protesters Want Saddam Executed, NEWSDAY, Jan. 21, 2004, at A14.
10 Id.
11 See James Drummond & Nicolas Pelham, Saddam Mocks Iraqi Court: Fears are
Raised that Former Dictator's Defiance will Re-open Old Wounds and Give Heart to
Insurgents, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), July 2, 2004, at 1, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Fintme File.
12 See Michael Kilian, U.S. Rocketing Down a Road that Leads to Victory, Vietnam-
Style, CHI. TRiB., Aug. 10, 2003, at C1.
13 Since the Allied Forces established the Nuremberg Tribunal to prosecute German
war criminals following World War II, the international community has continuously
rejected the view that individuals who commit human rights violations are not criminally
responsible merely because they were accepting orders. See Guenael Mettraux, Crimes
Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 43 HARv. INT'L L.J. 237, 308-11 (2002). As the
Nuremberg Tribunal stated:
Individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of
obedience imposed by the individual state. He who violates the laws of war cannot
obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if the state in
authorizing action moves outside its competence under international law.
The Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 120 (1946) (paraphrasing the charter of the League of
Nations). Based on the Nuremberg precedent, members of Saddam's regime who
followed orders and committed human rights atrocities are criminally accountable.
14 Attacks targeting U.S. military forces and Iraqi civilians have continued to occur
almost daily in Iraq, even in the wake of Saddam's capture. See, e.g., Thanassis
Cambanis, Captive Guerilla Tied to Hussein Said to Receive $1M for Attacks, BOSTON
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criminals- to justice if it hopes to stabilize the country, prevent future
violence, and gain legitimacy from its citizens and the international
community. 15
One option is the use of traditional criminal trials.' 6 Proponents of
criminal trials argue that those responsible for ordering, participating,
planning, or carrying out human rights abuses in Iraq must be punished.' 7
Opponents of this retributive-driven theory of justice argue that massive
prosecutions of this nature are ineffective in transitional, post-conflict
regions such as Iraq, 18 and that they do little in promoting a transitional
state's overarching goals of restoring peace and maintaining stability. 19
These commentators offer an alternative means of dispute resolution that,
they argue, can go further in reconciling the people who live in these
GLOBE, Dec. 18, 2003, at Al. U.S. Intelligence indicates that two days before his capture,
Saddam Hussein met with a top lieutenant, Qais Hattam, who was coordinating guerrilla
attacks on the "Highway of Death" leading north from Baghdad to Tikrit. Id. The U.S.
military seized Hattam and 73 suspected Fedayeen guerrillas in a farmhouse, along with
explosives and documents. ld. Hattam told a U.S. military commander that Saddam paid
him over $1 million to finance the attacks. Id. This event demonstrates that although
Saddam himself is no longer a threat, many of his supporters remain at large in Iraq and
continue to threaten the stability and viability of a democratically elected Iraqi
government.
15 See generally Thomas D. Grant, Agora (Continued): Future Implication of the
Iraqi Conflict: The Security Council and Iraq: An Incremental Practice, 97 AM. J. INT'L
L. 823, 829 (2003). The United Nations Security Council stated in Resolution 1500 that
the newly formed Iraqi Governing Council is an "an important step towards the formation
by the people of Iraq of an internationally recognized, representative government that
will exercise the sovereignty of Iraq." Id. at 834 (internal citation omitted).
16 See Christopher Greenwood, Where Should Saddam Face His Accusers?, TIMES
(London), Jan. 13, 2004, at 5.
17 Cf Michele Cotton, Back With a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an
Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1313, 1315-16
(2000) (explaining that the retributive theory of justice holds that the punishment of a
crime is a right in itself, that the guilty should suffer, and that justice, or the moral order,
requires the institution of punishment).
18 Charles Villa-Vicencio, Why Perpetrators Should Not Always be Prosecuted:
Where the International Criminal Court and Truth Commissions Meet, 49 EMORY L.J.
205, 209-13 (2000).
19 Maryam Kamali, Accountability for Human Rights Violations: A Comparison of
Transitional Justice in East Germany and South Africa, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 89,
96 (2001) ("Respect for the rule of law will, in turn, play an important role in bringing
about reconciliation and in deterring future human rights violations. Indirectly, then, the
emphasis on reforming the legal system is a constructive step in the pursuit of truth,
justice, and reconciliation.").
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conflicted regions and preventing the reoccurrence of similar conduct in the
future-a truth commission.20
The remainder of this Note discusses the recent development of truth
commissions as an alternative method of dispute resolution and assesses the
utility of a commission in post-conflict Iraq. While a limited use of a truth
commission in Iraq would be beneficial, international law and other practical
concerns demand the use of criminal trials in certain circumstances.
Therefore, the best solution in Iraq for dealing with human rights abusers
would be a hybrid system that utilizes both domestic trials and a truth
commission.
Part II of this Note provides an overview of the nature and extent of
human rights abuses documented during Saddam Hussein's regime. Part III
defines a truth commission, explains the logic that led to the development of
this alternative form of dispute resolution, and provides an illustration of the
most successful truth commission to date-the South African truth and
reconciliation commission. Part IV examines the efficacy of the other models
of justice (international criminal tribunals, domestic trials, and amnesties)
traditionally used in post-conflict regions and the utility of their potential
application in Iraq.
Part V examines the prospective legality of an Iraqi truth commission
under current international law and demonstrates why international law
requires some criminal liability for actors in Saddam's government. Part VI
addresses some of the practical concerns with the perceived legitimacy of
truth commissions as a method for addressing human rights violations in
post-conflict regions and determines that a truth commission used in
conjunction with domestic trials would bolster the legitimacy of the
commission. Finally, Part VII examines whether a pure truth commission is a
practical solution for the new Iraqi government to use in dealing with the
members of Saddam's former regime, and concludes that a hybrid system
with domestic trials and a truth commission is the better alternative.
II. BACKGROUND: SADDAM AND His GOVERNMENT'S RECORD OF
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
Saddam Hussein and his Ba'ath Party ruled Iraq for 25 years. 21 Saddam's
regime governed with an iron fist and maintained power by installing terror
20 Villa-Vicencio, supra note 18, at 213-15.
21 Danna Harman, The Day the Statue Fell, as Seen From Cairo to the Carolinas,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MoNrrOR, Apr. 14, 2003, at 1.
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and fear in the Iraqi citizenry. 22 Saddam presided over the Revolutionary
Command Council (RCC). The RCC drafted Iraq's laws and issued decrees,
which took precedence over all other Iraqi government institutions.23 The
content of these decrees directly establish the style and theme of Saddam's
leadership: absolutely no dissent or else.24
The human rights abuses documented during Saddam's rule are
astonishing. Political dissenters, women, Kurds, and Shi'a Muslims all
suffered tremendous persecution at the hands of Saddam and his regime. 25
Saddam's government tortured and killed thousands of political prisoners in
a government campaign to "cleanse" the Iraqi prisons.26 A 1990 RCC decree
authorized male relatives to kill female relatives in the "name of honor"
without any punishment. 27 Saddam's eldest son, Uday Hussein, was
notorious for the serial rape and murder of young women. 28 For example, in
2000, Uday's Fedayeen militia beheaded hundreds of women accused of
prostitution on the streets of Iraq without any judicial process. 29
22 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of Human
Rights in Iraq: Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2002/15, (Apr. 19, 2002). This
resolution is available at the UNHCHR website, http://www.unhchr.chL. On April 19,
2002, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights passed a resolution strongly condemning
"the systematic, widespread and extremely grave violation of human rights and of
international humanitarian law by the Government of Iraq, resulting in an all-pervasive
repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread
terror." Id. As this report indicates, Hussein's method for retaining control was to
eliminate the opposition and set an example to those who entertained the idea of
challenging his authority. See id.23 FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (London), Saddam Hussein: Crimes and
Human Rights Abuses, at http://www.iraqfoundation.org/hr/2002/cdec/irdp.pdf, at 5
(Nov. 2002).
24 One RCC decree, issued in 1992, guaranteed immunity for any Ba'ath Party
member who caused damage to property, bodily harm, or even death when pursuing
enemies of Hussein's regime. Id. at 5. Another RCC decree, passed in 2000, mandated
amputation of the tongue as punishment for slander against Saddam or his family. Id.
Decrees such as these demonstrate Saddam's method for preserving control over the Iraqi
citizenry: fear, terror, and persecution.
25 See id. at 9-18.
26 The Iraqi government prohibited families of those deceased prisoners from
burying their relatives, and often charged the prisoners' families for the bullet used in the
execution. Id. at 12.
27 Id. at 8.
28 Id. at 7.
29 Id. at 8. Uday maintained a personal torture chamber along the banks of the Tigris
river known as the "al-Ghurfa al-Hamra" (the "Red Room"). Id. at 7. In one infamous act
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Documents found in Iraq during the Gulf War detail Saddam's
persecution of hundreds of thousands of Kurds living in northern Iraq
throughout the 1980s.30 The recovered documents detail the arrests and
executions in 1983 of 8,000 Kurdish males over the age of 13. 31 Additional
reports indicate that over 100,000 Kurds disappeared or were killed between
the years of 1987 and 1988.32
The Iraqi Shi'a Muslim population also suffered greatly at the hands of
Saddam and his government. 33 Saddam routinely executed Shi'a leaders and
clerics who rose to power and threatened the authority of his rule.34 Saddam
and his Ba'ath Party's record of human rights abuses is astounding, and the
list of documented incidents will only expand as witnesses and victims who
once feared the dictator's wrath may now share their testimonies without the
fear of retribution.
Although Saddam may ultimately be responsible for ordering many of
these atrocities, there are thousands of other individuals who, over the last 25
years, followed Saddam's orders. Following orders is not a defense to human
rights violations under international law.35 As noted above, many of these
perpetrators are still living in Iraq, and the new Iraqi government must
establish a unified and national response for addressing these past violations.
of torture, Uday ordered the Iraqi soccer team caned on their feet after the team lost a
World Cup qualifying match. Id.
30 The four million documents found during the Gulf War confirmed Iraq's use of
chemical weapons in a well-orchestrated genocide aimed at the Kurds living in Iraq
during the 1980s. Holger Jensen, Biological, Chemical Weapons Have Long Been a Part
of Warfare, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Oct. 13, 2001, at 4A, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Rmtnew File.
31 FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, supra note 23, at 14.
32 Id.
33 Jeffrey Weiss, The Shiite State of Mind; They are the Majority in Iraq but Have a
History of Persecution and Sacrifice, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 10, 2003, at 1G,
available at LEXIS, News & Business, Dalnwsi File. The Shi'ites are the largest minority
sect in Islam. Id. They represent nearly 10% of the Muslim population worldwide and
approximately 60% of the population in Iraq. Id.
34 Reports indicate that more than 100 Shi'a clerics have disappeared in Iraq since
1991. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, supra note 23, at 16.
35 See Mettraux, supra note 13, at 307-08.
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HI. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS AS AN ALTERNATIVE
FORM OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Definition
A "truth commission" is now the common term "for an official
investigative body that documents a pattern of past human rights abuses. '36
In the last two decades, several states implemented state-run programs
resembling truth commissions, 37 and collectively these programs represent a
new political response to a past of massive state violence. 38 Truth
commissions provide an alternative method of addressing a state's violent
past when the violence resulted in widespread human rights violations that
occurred amidst ethnic, racial, class, or ideological disputes over justice and
power.39
Truth commissions are government bodies that have a specific mandate
to investigate and document alleged human rights violations within that
36 Judith Baker, Truth Commissions, 51 U. TORONTO L.J. 309, 309 (2001).
37 Some well-known examples of truth commissions are the commissions
established'in Chile, Argentina, El Salvador, Guatemala, and South Africa. PRICSCILLA B.
HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND ATROCrrY 15
(2001).
3 8 See Carsten Stahn, Accommodating Individual Criminal Responsibility and
National Reconciliation: The U.N. Truth Commission for East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT'L L.
952, 953,(2001). Stalin notes that:
The increasing reliance on truth and reconciliation commissions is based on the
perception that they serve various purposes that are usually beyond the reach of
national and international courts. Because they are vested with a general mandate to
investigate human wrongs committed during a specific political conflict, truth
commissions can amass a more comprehensive and diversified record of past
injustices than individual trials. Rather than establishing the individual guilt of a
person, they may focus on the broad patterns of violence in the conflict and their
causes. Furthermore, they constitute a particularly well-suited platform for the
accounts of victims and may uncover injustices otherwise silenced or denied.
Finally, they render justice to the victims by formally acknowledging the abuses
committed and providing for alternative forms of accountability, ranging from
monetary reparation to the public identification of the perpetrators.
Id. at 954 (internal citations omitted).
39 Henry J. Steiner, Truth Commissions: A Comparative Assessment; An
Interdisciplinary Discussion Held at Harvard Law School in May 1996, at 1, 7 (1997),
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp/Publications/truthl.html (last
visited Feb. 27, 2005).
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country during a particular period of time in that state's history.40 They are
investigative bodies only; they have no authority to unilaterally prosecute
individuals based on their findings. 41 Instead, truth commissions investigate
all aspects to a conflict in an attempt to establish a comprehensive version of
what actually happened in that particular state.42
Truth commissions are not adjudicative bodies. Unlike domestic trials or
international criminal tribunals, the findings of truth commissions do not
directly result in individual criminal liability.43 Truth commissions "seek to
discover the larger pattern of facts and conditions that led to massive human
rights violations." 44 In fact, this is the most contentious aspect of truth
commissions. As an incentive to develop this record and understanding of the
truth, truth commissions in the past have offered amnesty in exchange for a
full disclosure of the truth and circumstances behind an individual's human
rights violations.45
To put this in context, consider the situation in. Iraq. Saddam Hussein and
the Ba'ath Party ruled Iraq for 25 years. As discussed in Part II, tens of
thousands of people were victims of human rights violations. If the Iraqi
government established a truth commission to investigate the human rights
abuses that occurred during Saddam Hussein's regime, the purpose would be
to develop a comprehensive understanding of everything that happened
during the last quarter century when Saddam was in power. However, to
accomplish this, the government would have to provide some incentive to
former members of Saddam's government to come forward and confess. In
40Rose Weston, Facing the Past, Facing the Future: Applying the Truth
Commission Model to the Historic Treatment of Native Americans in the United States,
18 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1017, 1020 (2001).
41 Id. at 1020-21.
42 Id. at 1021. One international affairs expert, Priscilla Hayner, who has done
significant work in this area, stated that truth commissions typically have four basic
elements: (1) Truth commissions are formed "to investigate past abuses"; (2) "[t]ruth
commissions investigate" and document large incidents and "patterns of human rights
abuses"; (3) truth commissions are provisional bodies created for a specific period of
time and for a limited purpose, therefore the commission usually terminates upon
submission of the official report; and (4) the state sponsor of the truth commissions vests
the commission with enough authority to efficiently access information, conduct a
thorough investigation, which provides a certain amount of legitimacy to the
commission's final report. Id. at 1021 (internal citations omitted).
43 Id.
44id.
45 Id. at 1031.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
the past, this incentive has been amnesty, for it is unlikely that someone
would willingly come forward for anything less.
If these people did come forward, many families might discover what
happened to their loved ones. The new government would learn how such a
man rose to power and managed to maintain this control for as long as he
did. A comprehensive report could provide a plethora of answers to the
lingering questions from this regime, but the Iraqi government and citizens
will ultimately have to face the larger question: What are we willing to give
up in exchange for this version of the truth?
B. Transitional Justice: The Argument for the Use and Need of Truth
Commissions in Post-Conflict States
To fully understand the origins of truth commissions as an alternative to
traditional criminal prosecution and amnesties, it is important to appreciate
the notion of "transitional justice."46 This concept embraces the fact that
when a state has been the subject of civil strife or ethnic, racial, or class
violence, or has been overrun by a cruel totalitarian regime, that state has a
multitude of challenges before it.47 One of these challenges is addressing the
fallen leaders of the oppressive regime and the perpetrators of the past
violence.48 As a result of intense political pressure from the citizenry, this
task is often at the top of transitional states' agendas.49
When confronting past atrocities, states typically have two goals in mind:
reconciliation and deterrence. 50 Proponents of transitional justice argue that
46 See Erin Daly, Transformative Justice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation, 12
INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 73, 73-76 (2002).
47 Id. at 73. "As an anxious public and an impatient world look on," the new
governments "must create new governing bodies, write new laws and repeal old ones,
redefine the balance of private and public power, and organize elections." Id.
48 See generally Ruti G. Teitel, Human Rights in Transition: Transitional Justice
Genealogy, 16 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 69 (2003).
49 Daly, supra note 46, at 74.
50 HAYNER, supra note 37, at 30. As Hayner notes,
Common wisdom holds that the future depends on the past: one must confront the
legacy of past horrors or there will be no foundation on which to build a new
society. Bury your sins, and they will reemerge later. Stuff skeletons in the closet,
and they will fall back out of the closet at the most inauspicious times. Try to quiet
the ghosts of the past, and they will haunt you forever .... By directly confronting
the conflicts of the old... these conflicts will be less likely to explode into severe
violence or political conflict in the future.
Id.
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pure retribution, in the form of domestic or international criminal trials,
simply does not provide normative solutions to achieving the state's goals.51
They argue that because of the unique situations typically confronting states
in transition, states must implement a "transformative agenda" tailored to the
needs of that particular state.52 Truth commissions can play a significant part
in this transformative agenda.
Supporters of this view argue that truth commissions tailored to the
needs of particular states will facilitate the peaceful and stable transition of
the new governments and significantly assist these states in achieving their
goals of reconciliation and deterrence. 53 Since 1974, there have been
approximately 21 truth commissions. 54 The primary goal of all truth
commissions is to establish an accurate record of a country's past in an
attempt to clarify and acknowledge the truth about past state-sponsored
human rights abuses.55 However, truth commissions can also help facilitate a
state's transition from a civil war or oppressive regime toward a more
democratic, participatory, and representative-style government. 56 Democratic
51 Daly, supra note 46, at 108-09.
52 Id. at 109. As Daly notes, the problems confronting transitional governments vary
from region to region:
Injustice in these societies may have many different faces: it may be seen in the deep
rifts between people in different socio-economic classes or in rank racial or religious
division; it may manifest itself in the lack of information about the past regime; it
may be felt in the instability of the economy, or in the lack of adequate housing,
health care, education, and other basic needs; it may be noticed when known wrong-
doers stay in power or office or receive perquisites. In Rwanda, the genocide of
1994 left millions of people homeless and traumatized, and in desperate need of all
manner of social services; in South Africa, apartheid was marked by the deliberate
economic and civic repression of millions of blacks. In the former Yugoslavia, war
left entire cities in tatters and in desperate need of repair. The number of homeless
refugees in Afghanistan, East Timor, and Sierra Leone climbs daily.
Id. at 79-80.
53 See, e.g., HAYNER, supra note 37, at 15-20.
54 Id. at 14. Examples include those in Chile, Argentina, El Salvador, Guatemala,
and South Africa. Id. at 14-15.
55 Id. at 24-25 ("The most straightforward objective of a truth commission is
sanctioned fact-finding: to establish an accurate record of a country's past, clarify
uncertain events, and lift the lid of silence and denial from a contentious and painful
period of history.").
56Carrie J. Niebur Eisnaugle, Note, An International "Truth Commission":
Utilizing Restorative Justice as an Alternative to Retribution, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
209, 222 (2003). Similar to this notion is that "truth commissions are often implemented
in states struggling to create a fundamental change in the state's current power structure
and governance in favor of a more democratic structure, because a truth commission can
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governments are historically more favorable to human rights than military
dictatorships, communist governments, and other totalitarian regimes. As a
result, "as more countries adopt a more democratic form of government,
there has been a corresponding increase in the utilization of truth
commissions to help ease these transitions. '57
Advocates of truth commissions believe that truth commissions provide
transitional states with a better alternative than traditional criminal trials
because truth commissions are better equipped to respond to the individual
needs and interests of victims. 58 In this way, truth commissions contribute to
justice and provide accountability for perpetrators ofhuman rights abuses.59
Proponents argue that truth commissions are able "to outline institutional
responsibility" and recommend appropriate state reforms to ensure that past
mistakes are not repeated. 60
C. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A
Framework for How a Truth and Reconciliation Can Serve as an
Effective Alternative in Post-Conflict Regions
Although many truth commissions in the past failed in some respect, the
recent truth commission established in South Africa provides a shining
example of the potential benefits of this approach to restoring peace and
facilitating transition in post-conflict societies.61 The South African TRC has
be used to help emphasize the importance of human rights." Id. at 222-23 (internal
citations omitted).
57 Id. at 223.
58 HAYNER, supra note 37, at 28. Hayner argues that the "fundamental difference"
between a criminal trial and a truth commission is that truth commissions respond to the
needs of the victim, whereas trials focus only on the acts of the perpetrator. Id. Truth
commissions "take testimony from a broad array of witnesses, victims, and survivors, and
consider all of these accounts" in evaluating the conflict. Id. This allows victims to feel as
though they are more central to the process. Therefore, "[b]y listening to victims'
stories... commissions effectively give victims a public voice and bring their suffering
to the awareness of the broader public." Id.
59 See id. at 29.
60 Id. ("[Tiruth commissions are well positioned to evaluate the institutional
responsibilities for extensive abuses, and to outline the weaknesses in the institutional
structure or existing laws that should be changed to prevent abuses from reoccurring in
the future.").
61 Sir William Deane, Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia,
Address at the Presentation of the Sydney Peace Prize to Archbishop Desmond Tutu
(Nov. 26, 1999), at http://www.gg.gov.au/speeches/textonly/speeches/l1999/991126.html.
"Through his chairmanship of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Desmond Tutu
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emerged as a novel way to "deal with the past without dwelling on it, and to
establish the moral foundation from which to build a truly new [State]."62
Amidst overwhelming domestic and international political pressure, the
apartheid regime that controlled South Africa's government for thirty years
surrendered power in 1993.63 The former government and the new political
parties all participated in drafting the 1993 Interim Constitution of South
Africa.64 A critical provision in the new Constitution was the promise of
amnesty to several leaders of the apartheid regime who had participated in
South Africa's political war.65 However, this amnesty was conditional on an
appearance before a truth commission to be established in the future.
Although this provision received severe public opposition in the South
African community, this component proved to be the key for a peaceful
transition of power.66
In 1995, the South African Parliament established the South African
TRC to address the lingering questions from the old regime.67 The South
has provided to the world a shining example of peace-making, in the fullest sense of the
term, through a process of restorative justice, reconciliation and healing." Id.
62 Daly, supra note 46, at 84 (internal citation omitted).
63 Marianne Geula, Note, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission as
an Alternative Means of Addressing Transnational Government Conflicts in a Divided
Society, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 57, 60-62 (2000).
64Id. at 61.
65 Kamali, supra note 19, at 119.
66 The new South African government recognized that "people in South Africa still
had to live and work with each other after the change in government, [and that the
proposed] process for dealing with the human rights violations committed during the
apartheid years needed to assign accountability," but not in a way that would continue to
divide the country. Paul Lansing & Julie C. King, South Africa's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission: The Conflict Between Individual Justice and National
Healing in the Post-Apartheid Age, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 753, 761 (1998). Thus,
"success in the constitutional negotiations depended, to a large degree, on making a deal
with the previous regime, and Nuremberg-type trials were not an option if the country
was to reach democratic elections without a coup or chaos." Id. (internal citations
omitted).
67 The goals of the South African TRC, as stated in the Preamble of the Promotion
of National Unity Act of 1995, were "to provide for the investigation and the
establishment of as complete a picture as possible of the nature, causes[,] and extent of
gross violations of human rights" committed by the state during the apartheid era.
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (Preamble), available at
http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/legal/act9534.htm (last updated Apr. 10, 2003) [hereinafter
Reconciliation Act].
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African TRC had three primary goals: (1) to grant amnesty to apartheid
officials who fully disclosed the truth surrounding their violations; (2) to
establish "and mak[e] known the fate or whereabouts of victims" and restore
human and civil dignity to such victims "by granting them an opportunity to
relate their own accounts of the violations of which they [were] victims;" and
(3) to make "recommendations of measures to prevent the future violations
of human rights." 68
The South African TRC established three committees to aid in achieving
its goals; the Human Rights Violation Committee,69 the Reparations and
Rehabilitation Committee, 70 and the Amnesty Committee.71 The Amnesty
Committee was responsible for processing applications for amnesty and
making determinations with regard to whether or not the committee should
grant amnesty to perpetrators. 72 Generally, if the perpetrator committed the
human rights abuses with political motivations and fully disclosed all
relevant facts related to the violations, full amnesty would be given.73
Although the commission was not a trial, proponents of the South
African TRC contended that the amnesty process did result in the
perpetrators accepting some level of accountability, despite its lack of
In the new South African government's view, this commission could "provide
victims of past human rights abuses an opportunity to relate the violations they suffered
and to be given reparations to rehabilitate them." Kamali, supra note 19, at 120.
68 Lansing & King, supra note 66, at 761-62.
69 The Human Rights Violation Committee was responsible for conducting victim
hearings-this committee took more than 21,000 victim statements. Richard John Galvin,
The Case for a Japanese Truth Commission Covering World War II Era Japanese War
Crimes, 11 TUL. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 59, 99 (2003).
70 The Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee assisted in the reparations process
which under the Reconciliation Act mandated that reparations be paid to all designated
victims. Reconciliation Act, ch. 2, § 4(f), ch. 5, § 26(3).
71 The Amnesty Committee was the committee principally responsible for making
the amnesty determinations. Reconciliation Act, ch. 4, § 21(1).
72 Lansing & King, supra note 66, at 764-65. The Amnesty Committee considered
six criteria when it reviewed an amnesty application:
(1) the motive of the offender; (2) the context and circumstances of the act,
including whether the act was political; (3) the legal and factual nature of the
offense; (4) the objective of the act, in particular whether it was politically motivated
and whether it was directed against the State or an individual; (5) whether the
offense was committed on behalf of a political organization; (6) the proportional
relationship between the act and any political objective.
Id.
73 Id.
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traditional punishment-incarceration. 74 First, the South African TRC did
not provide for a blanket amnesty to human rights violators, as the world has
seen on many occasions in post-conflict states.75 Furthermore, the South
African TRC held public hearings in which those seeking amnesty had to
publicly apologize for their acts as a condition to amnesty. 76 The intent and
belief of the commission was that the social sanctions of public disapproval,
ostracism, shame, embarrassment, and disadvantage could amount to a
serious punishment in itself.77
A limited Iraqi truth commission would gain valuable insight from
following certain aspects of the South African model. First, under the South
African model, amnesty is given only after a full disclosure of the truth. Iraqi
commission officials need to investigate and cross-reference versions to
ensure that the commission is receiving an accurate and comprehensive
version of the events that took place. Second, in the South African model,
amnesty is given only for politically motivated crimes. This is a good
threshold for what violations will and will not receive amnesty, and the Iraqi
government should use a similar provision in the formation of their
commission. Although "politically motivated" is loosely defined, this
provision is critical to ensure that perpetrators of violence who lacked any
political motivations whatsoever do not receive amnesty. Finally, a public
74 Neil J. Kritz, Accountability for International Crime and Serious Violations of
Fundamental Human Rights: Coming to Terms With Atrocities: A Review of
Accountability Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB., Autumn 1996, at 141. Although truth commissions cannot be viewed as a
substitute for prosecutions, commissions do serve many of the same purposes. Truth
commissions:
(1) provide[] the mandate and authority for an official investigation of past abuses;
(2) permit[] a cathartic public airing of the evil and pain that has been inflicted,
resulting in an official record of the truth; (3) provide[] a forum for victims and their
relatives to tell their story, have it made part of the official record, and thereby
provide a degree of societal acknowledgment of their loss; and (4) in some cases,
establish[] a formal basis for subsequent compensation of victims and/or punishment
of perpetrators.
Id.
75 Rather, the South African TRC "offered [a] pragmatic resolution of the core
dilemma of transition, namely, the problem of attributing individual responsibility for
systematic wrongs perpetrated under repressive rule." Anurima Bhargava, Note, Defining
Political Crimes: A Case Study of the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1304, 1307-08 (2002) (internal citation omitted).
76 Id. at 1308.
77 Id. These hearings also educated the citizenry of the country's past and aided in
the reconciliation process between black and white South Africans. See id.
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reprimand and apology is a fair balance between providing a sense of
retribution to the victims and their families and promoting the State's larger
goals of reconciling the community and deterring future violence.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFICACY OF TRADITIONAL MODELS OF
JUSTICE APPLIED TO POST-CONFLICT REGIONS
Sadly, the twentieth century has a lengthy record of incidents of gross
human rights abuses.78 In many cases, the perpetrator of the violence is the
state and the victims are certain groups living within the state, namely
political dissenters, ethnic and religious minorities, women, or other
minorities.79 In the 1930s and 1940s, Adolf Hitler and members of his Third
Reich transported millions of Jews living in Germany and throughout Europe
to death camps.80 The generally accepted estimate is that Hitler and his
government ordered the extermination of roughly six million Jews during his
reign. 81
Incidents of human rights atrocities did not end with Germany's defeat in
World War II. In the 1970s and 1980s, Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet
ordered the detainment, torture, and execution of thousands of Chilean
citizens. 82 Pinochet instigated this violence as part of an international
conspiracy, named Operation Condor, to track down and dispose of his
political opponents. 83 More recently, during a three-month period in 1994,
Hutu leaders in Rwanda coordinated and incited the brutal murder of an
78 See Catherine Powell, Symposium in Celebration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Introduction: Locating Culture, Identity, and
Human Rights, 30 COLuM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 201, 218 (1999).
79 Id. Conflicts are increasingly occurring within states, rather than between them.
Id. These internal conflicts are often a result of religious and ethnic differences, and the
victims in these conflicts are frequently targeted "because of their membership in
particular religious, ethnic, racial, linguistic, or indigenous groups." Id.
80 See Max Frankel, 150th Anniversary: 1851-2001; Turning Away From the
Holocaust, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at H9.
81 Michael J. Bazyler, Austin Owen Lecture: Litigating the Holocaust, 33 U. RICH.
L. REV. 601, 602 (1999).
82 See, e.g., Jorge Correa S., Dealing with Past Human Rights Violations: The
Chilean Case After Dictatorship, 67 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1455, 1466-68 (1992).
83 William J. Aceves, Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: The Pinochet
Case and the Move Toward a Universal System of Transnational Law Litigation, 41
HARV. INT'L L.J. 129, 160 (2000).
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estimated 800,000 Tutsi.84 Nearly ten percent of Rwanda's total population
lost their lives during this three-month period in a genocide carried out by
their fellow countrymen. 85 Sierra Leone, 86 the Balkans, 87 Cambodia,88 and
East Timor89 are all states that fell victim, in the last decade, to massive tolls
of human rights violations. Each of the above situations was unique, but
84 Mark A. Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in
Rwanda's Domestic Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 545, 547 (1998).
85 Id.
86 Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent
Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 28 (2001). Since 1991, a civil war between the
Sierra Leone government and the Liberia-backed rebel Revolutionary United Front
(RUF) has crippled the country. See id.
In a ruthless campaign aimed at profiting from Sierra Leone's vast gold and
diamond reserves, the RUF attempted to win the "allegiance" of people through the
exhaustive employment of terror. RUF tactics included the abduction and forced
recruitment of children and the use of narcotics to turn them into effective killers,
often against their own family members. Widespread killing, rape, and torture were
common, and those suspected of supporting the government-as well as their
children and infants-had limbs amputated in a form of "rule by terror."
Id.
87 David M. Kresock, "Ethnic Cleansing" in the Balkans: The Legal Foundations of
Foreign Intervention, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 203, 228 (1994). When the former Republic
of Yugoslavia fell apart in the early 1990s, conflict broke out. Id. at 223. Serious human
rights abuses followed, including the following unofficial reports: an "August 21, 1992,
massacre of over 200 Muslim men and boys by Serb police in the Vlasica mountains in
Central Bosnia"; the "murder of 2,000 to 3,000 Muslim men, women, and children in
May and June of 1992 by Serb irregulars at a brick factory and pig farm near Brko"; the
"May 18, 1992, murder of 56 Muslims by Serb militiamen in Grbavci"; the "regular,
daily execution of 20 Muslim prisoners held by Serbs at the Omarska Camp in central
Bosnia"; "Serb soldiers breaking the necks of Muslim children abandoned in a hospital";
the "November 20, 1991 mass killing of 300 Muslims by Serb soldiers outside Vukovar";
and "the execution of as many as 5,000 Muslims in late May of 1992 by Serbian forces in
the town of Kozarac." Id.
88 See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, The United Nations Group of Experts for Cambodia,
93 AM. J. INT'L L. 948, 948 (1999).
89 Tania Voon, Closing the Gap Between Legitimacy and Legality of Humanitarian
Intervention: Lessons From East Timor and Kosovo, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
31, 57 (2002). In a report issued by the International Commission of Inquiry, the
commission found that Indonesian military groups engaged in "gross violations of human
rights and breaches of humanitarian law which varied over time and took the form of
systematic and widespread intimidation, humiliation and terror, destruction of property,
violence against women and displacement of people." Id.
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when the violence in these regions subsided, a common question arose: What
should happen with the perpetrators of these human rights crimes? 90
A. International Criminal Tribunals
One traditional method of dealing with perpetrators of human rights
violations is a criminal trial. Over the last century, individual states and the
international community have experimented with both international criminal
tribunals and domestic trials.91 Over the last few decades, "there has been a
significant increase in the number of requests for international assistance to
enforce international humanitarian law through criminal prosecutions. '92 The
Nuremberg Tribunal, organized by the Allied Powers after World War II,
marked the first time the modem world united to address and condemn the
perpetrators of international human rights abuses.93 The Nuremberg
Tribunal's precedent paved the way for the creation of several, more recent,
multilateral international tribunals to prosecute those who violate
90 See Chandra Lekha Sriram, Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to
Past Abuses, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 301, 426-29 (2003).
91 As stated by international legal scholar Mark Drumbl:
International criminal law aspires to prosecute alleged perpetrators of grievous
human rights abuses. These prosecutions are to take place adversarily in criminal
trials. If these alleged perpetrators are in fact found guilty, they are to be punished.
Many international treaties and decisions involving state obligations with respect to
gross violations of human rights speak of obligations to investigate, prosecute, and
punish. As such, accountability is largely conflated with criminal process followed
by punishment, which, under international criminal law, overwhelmingly takes the
form of incarceration. Since accountability is cast as a prerequisite for justice, the
criminal trial and the jailhouse become causally connected to justice as well.
Mark A. Drumbl, Toward a Criminology of International Crime, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP.
RESOL. 263, 264 (2003). The proliferation of institutions, such as the International
Criminal Court, the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and special
courts in Sierra Leone and Cambodia demonstrate the international push for addressing
international crimes with criminal trials. Id. at 265.
92 Daryl A. Mundis, New Mechanisms for the Enforcement of International
Humanitarian Law, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 934, 934 (2001).
93 Gerry J. Simpson, Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments
in International Law: Panel II: Adjudicating Violence: Problems Confronting
International Law and Policy on War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Didactic
and Dissident Histories in War Crimes Trials, 60 ALB. L. REV. 801, 804-05 (1997); see
also Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945,
82 U.N.T.S. 279.
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international humanitarian law norms,94 namely, the United Nations Security
Council's 1993 establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 95 and the United Nations Security Council's 1994
establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 96
Supporters of the tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda argue that "the
Security Council and the international community must now accept the
challenge and create the precedent for a more rigorous enforcement of
humanitarian law." 97 The gravity of the human rights abuses and their
unsavory reputation could mean that a failure to punish would significantly
compromise the legitimacy of international humanitarian norms. 98 Advocates
of international tribunals believe that international tribunals develop an
"unprecedented jurisprudence of international humanitarian law." 99 In their
94 See John Quigley, Soviet Influences on International Criminal Law in the
Nuremberg Era, 7 CRIM. L.F. 447, 447-48 (1996) (book review).
95 Sean D. Murphy, Developments in International Criminal Law: Progress and
Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM.
J. INT'L L. 57, 57 (1999).
96 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., 3453d mtg. at 15, art. 23(3), U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994), available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
97 Theodor Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, FOREIGN AFF.,
Summer 1993, at 122, 135. In another piece Meron wrote, "The credibility of the
international system of justice requires prosecutions for atrocities everywhere .... "
Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of International Law,
88 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 79 n.2 (1994).
98 Lucas W. Andrews, Comment, Sailing Around the Flat Earth: The International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as a Failure of Jurisprudential Theory, 11 EMORY
INT'L L. REv. 471,480-81 (1997).
99 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 95, at 95. Professor Murphy notes that prior to the
ICTY's establishment the primary sources of international judicial precedent were the
fifty-year-old decisions of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals. Id. Professor Murphy
argues that the ICTY facilitates the growth of a corpus of international judicial decisions
that significantly affect international humanitarian law. Id. These areas include:
[T]he central requirements for proving notorious crimes, such as "torture" and
"crimes against humanity"; the attribution of crimes to superiors pursuant to theories
of "command responsibility"; [and] the permissibility of defenses to such crimes,
such as those based on reprisal or duress; the manner in which suspects may be
apprehended, imprisoned, tried, and punished; the rights of suspects to counsel,
cross-examination of witnesses, and exculpatory evidence; and the treatment of
victims and witnesses.
Id. Professor Murphy argues that the ICTY's decision will affect the future work of
international courts and national courts. Id. These "assessments will likely have a ripple
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view, no matter how many human rights cases actually reach the trial stage,
the very existence of the tribunals sends a powerful message. 100 In addition,
"[tiheir statutes, rules of procedure and evidence, and practice stimulate the
development of the law," and "[tihe possible fear by states that the activities
of such tribunals might preempt national prosecutions could also have the
beneficial effect of spurring prosecutions before national courts for serious
violations of humanitarian law."'101
Despite the perceived benefits of international criminal tribunals, the
Security Council's tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda- have been severely
criticized. 10 2 Some of the critics focus on the fact that several of the most
notorious criminals have yet to be indicted, while others who the tribunals
have indicted remain unpunished. 103 This problem is exacerbated by the fact
that the Security Council members who established the tribunals will not
authorize deployment of their troops to assist these regions with the arrest
and prosecutions of wanted suspects hiding within these countries.104
Opponents also argue that the tribunals, particularly in Yugoslavia, failed
in their primary function of restoring peace to these regions. 10 5 Furthermore,
the tribunals suffer from serious logistical, structural, and political concerns
because "[t]heir lofty mandates have been tempered by the political contexts
in which they were set and the climates in which they operate."'1 6 Critics
effect on the development of both international law and national law outside the context
of international humanitarian law." Id. at 96.
100 Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J.
INT'LL. 554, 555 (1995).
101 Id.
102 See, e.g., Makau Mutua, From Nuremberg to the Rwanda Tribunal: Justice or
Retribution?, 6 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 77, 87 (2000).
103 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 95, at 95. One gleaning example is Slobodan
Milogevi6. Id.
104 Robert Marquand, Bosnia War Crimes Judge Talks of Quitting: Wants West to
Capture Big Fry, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 22, 1996, at 1.
105 Murphy, supra note 95, at 95. Although the Security Council established the
ICTY in 1993, its establishment did not prevent the commission of atrocities in
Srebrenica in the summer of 1995 or in Kosovo in 1998. Id.
106 See Mutua, supra note 102, at 87. A 1997 investigation by the United Nations
found that the ICTR's Registry "had no accounting system; that the tribunal had
incomplete and unreliable financial records; unqualified staff; disregard of UN
regulations; shortage of cells and courtrooms; lack of lawyers and investigators; lack of
logistical, transport, and office equipment; and neglect of the tribunal by U.N.
headquarters in New York." Id. at 88-89. These obstacles, coupled with a lack of funding
and poor infrastructure, have prevented the effective establishment of the ICTR and its
work. Id. at 89; see also Craig Turner, Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal Mismanaged,
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believe that the establishment of the international tribunals "was simply a
cost-free effort by some governments to assuage their guilt about not
intervening meaningfully in the former Yugoslavia prior to 1995,"107 and in
Rwanda prior to the genocide. 10 8 Underlying all of the opponent's arguments
is the notion that the ICTY and ICTR raised serious questions of "fairness
and political privilege," and "[n]o matter how successful the ad hoc tribunals
may be at dealing with specific crises situations, their selective creation and
narrow focus creates an impression of unfairness and unequal treatment." 10 9
While the purported intentions of the Security Council in establishing the
tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda are laudable in theory, in practice the
tribunals suffered from significant flaws. The obstacles confronted by these
tribunals indicate that an internationally mandated criminal tribunal for Iraq
may not be the best solution. Insurmountable international pressure
encompassed Allied Forces' efforts to prosecute Nazi war criminals after
World War II; therefore, the Nuremberg Tribunal did not suffer from the
same political, financial, and logistical restraints that its successors have
faced. The unpopularity and political objection that stains the United States'
war efforts in Iraq demonstrate that a proposed international criminal tribunal
in Iraq would likely face significant international objection. This type of
negative impetus could tremendously thwart an Iraqi tribunal's ability to
operate effectively, and the legitimacy of such a tribunal could be highly
suspect.
Furthermore, the use of international criminal tribunals in the last few
decades has been in regions where the humanitarian abuses arose as a result
of massive internal, ethnic conflicts. In these situations, victim-run national
trials could give the appearance of vengeance rather than punishment, thus
spurring further resentment and future violence. International criminal
tribunals used in regions of internal conflict go further in creating the
perception of legitimacy and assisting in the reconciliation of ethnic or
Report Says; Africa: The Problems Have Slowed Efforts to Prosecute Killers in
Genocide, U.N. Says, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 1997, at 8; John Goshko, U.N. Probe Find
Mismanagement, Waste in Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal, WASH. POST., Feb. 13, 1997, at
A20.
107 Murphy, supra note 95, at 95.
108 Mutua, supra note 102, at 82 ("If the former Yugoslavia suffered from
international inaction, the world seemed asleep, uncaring, as ominous clouds gathered
over Rwanda, igniting a murderous inferno as they touched the ground.").
109 Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complimentarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of
National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383, 386
(1998).
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religious groups. 110 However, the Iraqi population is overcoming decades of
oppression by a totalitarian regime, and not an internal civil war. As noted
above, there is strong voice from within Iraq to deal with members of
Saddam's government internally; therefore, some type of domestic solution,
as opposed to an international tribunal, may be a more appropriate solution in
Iraq.
B. National Trials
Domestic or national trials are another option for post-conflict states
addressing internal humanitarian abuses.- 1 Many of the problems associated
with domestic trials arise from the fragile condition of a majority of these
regions in the aftermath of conflict.112 Oftentimes, a state's entire judicial
system is either too compromised, too weak, or simply lacking the
infrastructure or resources to conduct large-scale criminal trials. 1 3 Criminal
prosecutions are also incredibly time-consuming and expensive. 114 In many
post-conflict regions, the potential number of arrests and prosecutions could
I10 But see Laura A. Dickinson, Note, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 295, 302 (2003). "[In light of the continuing ethnic tensions within the region,
the ICTY was established at The Hague, far removed from the scene of the atrocities, and
the court was staffed by international judges and staff. However, the lack of connection to
local populations has been problematic." Id. Similarly, as a result of the ongoing violence
in Iraq, an international tribunal established in Iraq may be forced to operate from a
remote location. This fact could negatively affect the legitimacy of an international
tribunal in the eyes of the Iraqi people.
111 See, e.g., Kritz, supra note 74, at 132.
112 See generally Wendy S. Betts & Gregory Gisvold, Conflict Mapping: Innovation
in International Responses in Post-Conflict Societies, HUM. RTS. BR., Spring 2003, at 24.
113 Christopher J. Roederer, "Living Well is the Best Revenge "-If One Can: An
Invitation to the Creation of Justice Off the Beaten Path, 15 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 75, 94
(1999).
114 In South Africa, the government asked the citizenry how important it was for
them to prosecute the leaders of the apartheid regime given that the 12 million rand
(approximately U.S. $1.3 million) in taxpayer-supported court costs that were spent to
prosecute the former Minister of Defense yielded an acquittal. See The Moral
Foundations of Truth Commissions, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH
COMMISSIONs 23, at 77 (Robert I. Rothberg & Dennis Thompson eds., Princeton 2000).
The costs states would incur in prosecuting every criminal case would be extraordinary,
and oftentimes these funds are desperately needed elsewhere. See also Daly, supra note
46, at 104 ("Punishment for wrongs is important, but so are electricity, medical care, jobs
programs, education, [and] housing.").
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be in the thousands. 1 15 The majority of post-conflict states have extremely
limited prison space and an insufficient number of personnel to operate the
prisons."l 6 Furthermore, this caseload would overwhelm state judiciaries'
already limited infrastructure, resulting in overbooked dockets, 117 gratuitous
plea bargains, and, therefore, minimal accountability for many significant
criminals.118
Assuming a post-conflict state did have the physical infrastructure and
human capital to conduct extensive domestic trials, there are other arguments
against a state's use of domestic trials in these situations. For one, domestic
trials do not provide a comprehensive version of the truth. 119 Establishing a
full record of the truth surrounding the motives and actual commission of the
human rights abuses provides a necessary tool for new governments in post-
conflict states. 120 A full account of the truth can facilitate the victims'
115 Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt To Shame To Civis In
Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1221, 1286 (2000). "The Rwandan government has, as part
of its domestic public policy, opted for extensive judicial prosecution and incarceration as
the principal device to promote the rule of law, order, and, purportedly, national
reconciliation in postgenocidal Rwanda." Id. This policy resulted in the detainment of
approximately 125,000 individuals by 1999. Id.
116 In 1999, in Rwanda, there were approximately 125,000 prisoners in Rwandan
jails designed to hold a maximum of 15,000. Id. Undoubtedly, government resources
needed for prisoners' food and other basic needs could be used elsewhere by the state.
See id.
117 In Rwanda, for example:
The sheer bulk of genocide suspects and cases due for trial has placed severe
strain on Rwanda's criminal justice system which is already crippled by poor
infrastructure and the death of professionals during the genocide. Rwanda's prisons
are heavily congested, and the cost of feeding and clothing prisoners is a drain on
the economy.
The lack of an adequate number of prosecutors, judges, and lawyers to try the
cases exacerbates the already bad situation. At the present rate, it would take over
200 years if Rwanda was to rely on the conventional court system to deliver justice.
Official website of the Government of Rwanda, at http://www.rwandal.com/-
govemment/index.html.
118 See The Human Rights Center and the International Human Rights Law Clinic et
al., Justice, Accountability and Social Reconstruction: An Interview Study of Bosnian
Judges and Prosecutors, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 102, 109 (2000).
119 Daly, supra note 46, at 103. The problem with the traditional criminal justice
system is that, because of the "limited scope of each trial's inquiry" and the
"manipulation of rules of evidence that govern the release of information," trials do not
provide a comprehensive version of the truth. Id.
120 Mary Ellen O'Connell, Symposium on Method in International Law, New
International Legal Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 334, 342 (1999). "[T]ruth commissions
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healing process (reconciliation) and help the new government prevent future
violence (deterrence).' 21
Proponents of this view argue that domestic trials are unlikely to achieve
a state's goals of reconciliation and deterrence. 122 Public trials are inherently
adversarial; therefore, large domestic trials could cause extreme tension and
resentment in ethnically, religiously, or politically divided states, 123
especially in states where sympathizers of the former government or
controlling group continue to live these states.124 Nor do the critics believe
that domestic trials serve a state's goal of deterrence. Domestic trials do not
identify the source(s) of the problem that led to the state-sponsored crimes or
civil strife.125 If the new government is unable to determine the source of the
past violence, it will be difficult for the state to take measures that would
prevent similar conduct from occurring in the future. 12 6
Despite the problems inherent with large-scale domestic trials in post-
conflict states, there are strong arguments as to why domestic trials are
'are usually designed not to inflict legal punishment but as "a kind of non-adversarial
process of re-establishing democratic justice by exposing the truth,' .... which will in turn
foster national reconciliation. Id. (citations omitted).
121 See Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 2031, 2100 (1998).
122 See, e.g., Daly, supra note 46,-at 105-06. Daly argues that trials do not further
national reconciliation because of their inherently adversarial nature. Id. at 105. Trials
"reinforce the power that the new regime wields over adherents of the old." Id. at 106.
Daly argues that trials separate members of these societies and they fail to bring people
together. See id. In Daly's opinion, criminal trials are also unlikely to solve the state's
problem of deterring future violence. According to this theory, criminal trials do not
address the "causes of the wrong"; rather, their "primary concern is to remove it from
society, not to understand it." Id. Daly argues that in situations involving mass atrocities,
the wrong is "woven into the fabric of society" and its "etiology must be understood and
treated." Id.
123See MARTHA MINow, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 26 (1998).
124. See Daly, supra note 46, at 105-06. Public trials could be interpreted as the new
government exhibiting their power and authority over the old regime, which could
potentially lead to future resentment and conflict in these regions.
125 Id. A corollary to this notion is that domestic trials do not expose the "state of
mind" of the state or the individual perpetrators of the violence, which makes it difficult
for new governments to adopt strategies that would prevent the violence from reoccurring
in the future. See id.
126 Id. at 105. Traditional criminal trials focus on individual responsibility and
accountability. See id. "In transitional societies rife with massive violations of human
rights, however, crime is the norm. It is not sufficient to remove an isolated offender,
even a leader; rather, it is necessary to treat, and transform, the society as a whole." Id.
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necessary, namely to ensure individual criminal responsibility. 127 Some
argue that, if conducted effectively, domestic trials are the most efficient
means for achieving a state's goals of reconciliation and deterrence. 128 To be
successful, domestic trials must be open to public scrutiny and provide a full
accounting of the former regime's criminal conduct. 129 Furthermore, each
domestic tribunal must be unique and tailored to meet the needs of the
particular population in question. 130
Prosecution of human rights crimes before domestic courts can serve
important purposes. 131 Domestic trials can "enhance the legitimacy and
127 See, e.g., Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A
Framework for Understanding Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HuM. RTs. J. 39, 42-43
(2002). Many countries believe prosecutions are necessary to redress criminal activity.
See id. "[I]n the United States, there is a debate about whether offenders should be
punished in prisons or rehabilitated in half-way houses; whether or not harsh sanctions
have an appreciable deterrent effect; and whether or not reconciliation programs can be
attached effectively to prosecutions." Id. Although these disagreements arise, "in the
West the determination of individual culpability through prosecution is commonly
regarded as necessary to redress criminal actions." Id. at 42. In the United States, there is
a "widely held faith in prosecution-whether the goal is punishment or deterrence,
condemnation or rehabilitation." Id.
128 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity for International Crimes, 71 U. COLO.
L. REV. 409, 410 (2000). Professor Bassiouni argues that, "Throughout history, societies
have resorted to the institutionalization of criminal justice as a means to achieve public
order insofar as that type of justice removes the need for individual vengeance and avoids
a continuing cycle of violence." Id. This experience "reveals that punishment is a
deterrent, provided that the chances for successful prosecution and conviction are high
and that the penalty is more costly to the perpetrator than the benefit of committing the
crime." Id. Therefore, criminal trials can reconcile post-conflict communities and provide
for an effective deterrent. See id.
129 Major Jeffrey L. Spears, Sitting in the Dock of the Day: Applying Lessons
Learned from the Prosecution of War Criminals and Other Bad Actors in Post-Conflict
Iraq and Beyond, MIL. L. REV. 96, June 2003, at 153. If trials are monitored to ensure
that they provide forums of justice and not of vengeance, trials of human rights abusers
before domestic forums "can further the interests of justice and complement the ultimate
goal of the reconciliation of the belligerents and the restoration of peace." Id. Providing
fair forums is especially important "if the society is composed of diverse populations that
have never integrated into a coherent society." Id. at 155.
130 See id. at 188.
131 See id. at 155. Major Spears argues that criminal trials can serve both the
domestic needs of the victorious parties to the conflict and the civilian populations who
were victims of the former state's violence. Id. Trials serve the "domestic needs of the
victorious parties to the conflict by subjecting to justice the principals of an unlawful war
characterized by mass atrocities. This process of accountability-as with a traditional
criminal case--can reduce the animosity of the civilian populations harmed by the
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credibility of a fragile new government, demonstrating its determination to
hold individuals accountable for their crimes."' 132 Domestic trials can provide
"an important focus for rebuilding the domestic judiciary and criminal justice
system, establishing local courts as a credible forum for the redress of
grievances in a nonviolent manner." 133 Finally, domestic courts can be more
sensitive to the nuances of local culture.134
Domestic trials must be used in conjunction with the truth commission in
Iraq. It is simply impracticable for the Iraqi government to transition from 25
years of totalitarian rule to a democracy while also trying to prosecute the
thousands of potential suspects living in Iraq. Iraq does not have the human
capital (i.e., lawyers, judges, prosecutors, court personnel) or physical
infrastructure (jails and courts) to realistically conduct these widespread
prosecutions. However, there will be situations in which domestic trials are
necessary. As discussed above, truth commissions assist a transitional state in
its goals of reconciliation and deterrence. There are certain actors that cannot
be deterred and certain crimes that cannot be reconciled. The Iraqi
government needs to determine who these actors are and what crimes are
irreconcilable and incorporate this in the establishment of the hybrid system.
C. Amnesties
Amnesties resulting from political compromise represent another method
employed by post-conflict states to address past state-sponsored human rights
violations.1 35 Unfortunately, most attempts to prosecute individuals accused
unlawful acts of the principals." Id. at 154. Furthermore, "[b]y fixing responsibility at the
leadership level, the injured populations can receive the psychological benefits of the
justice system, while the process prevents the return of the bad actors to power." Id.
Trials can benefit the civilian populations as well. When trials are "conducted in an
open forum calculated to develop a full accountability, the domestic population can
understand the scope of the atrocities that played a part in the decision of the victors to go
to war." Id. Finally, in societies "that have not known the rule of law," these people "can
receive an introduction to a justice system governed by process rather than outcome." Id.
132 Kritz, supra note 74, at 132-33.
133 Id.
134 Domestic trial, as opposed to international tribunals or other mechanisms for
justice, "could be of greater and more immediate symbolic force because verdicts would
be rendered by courts familiar to the local community." Preliminary Report of the
Independent Commission of Experts Established in Accordance with Security Council
Resolution 935, U.N. SCOR, at 31 (1994).
135 Dr. Kristin Henrard, The Viability of National Amnesties in View of the
Increasing Recognition of Individual Criminal Responsibility at International Law, 8
MSU-DCL J. INT'L L. 595, 613 (1999).
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of human rights crimes have not been as successful as the trials at
Nuremberg. Defeat of an oppressive regime is not always as absolute as it
was in World War II, and the majority of human rights violations arise out of
internal, not international, conflicts. 136 In South Africa, El Salvador, and
Chile for example, a peaceful transition of power required political
compromises.' 37 Before the leaders of these regimes agreed to relinquish
power to the new governments, the former leaders demanded the new
government grant them amnesty for their crimes as a condition to
surrender. 138 These countries and many others over the last few decades
viewed this compromise as a small price to pay for a peaceful transition of
power and the prospect of a liberated state.139
Although no one directly promotes the use of amnesties, many realize
that political realties mandate their use by states under certain
circumstances.1 40 When oppressive regimes fall, the remnants of that regime
136 See Daly, supra note 46, at 102. In the majority of situations, "victory
is ... wrested from the previous regime through tenuous military victory or cautious
negotiation and bargaining." Id. Furthermore, "[i]n most instances, long-lasting and
secure peace will only emerge with the involvement of multiple parties no one of which
would typically accept massive prosecutions against it." Id.
137 See generally Mark Gibney, Decommunization: Human Rights Lessons from the
Past and Present, and Prospects for the Future, 23 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 87, 114-19
(1994) (describing transition to democracy in several countries).
138 Id.
139 Id.
14 0 The arguments for and against domestic and international trials and amnesties
represent the competing interests that are at stake when a new government assumes
control. Consider the case of Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. See Michael J. Kelly,
The International Criminal Court: Case Studies "Ripe" for the International Criminal
Court: Practical Applications for the Pinochet, Ocalan, and Libyan Bomber Trials, 8
MSU-DCL J. INT'L L. 21, 23-24 (1999). Pinochet ruled Chile for 17 years. During this
time, Pinochet tortured and executed thousands of political dissidents. Id. Amidst intense
domestic and international pressure, Pinochet agreed to relinquish power and hold
democratic elections. Id. A condition to this surrender, however, was the new government
granting Pinochet amnesty for the crimes he committed during his reign. Id. This
compromise infuriated many of the families of the tortured victims. Id. However, what
truly was the new government's alternative?
Unfortunately, the new government in Chile cannot change the past or bring back the
victims of Pinochet's violence. The new Chilean government had the opportunity to
avoid further loss of life and the prospect of a democratically elected government in
exchange for Pinochet and other leaders' amnesty. These inherent dilemmas are the
reason many scholars are looking at truth and reconciliation commissions as a better
alternative.
553
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
do not simply disappear. 141 Members, sympathizers, and supporters of those
regimes continue to live and work in these states, and new governments have
to adopt solutions to these situations. 142 This reality, inherent in internal
conflicts, is largely what led to the development of the truth and
reconciliation commission as an alternative means of addressing these
situations. 14 3
The proposed hybrid system in Iraq recognizes that, to facilitate a
peaceful transition to the new Iraqi government, some form of amnesty is
essential. The new government will have a variety of social obstacles facing
it, and the country as a whole would be better served if the new government's
resources were not fully spent on fighting the remnants of Saddam's regime.
The hybrid system does not grant the former oppressors blanket amnesties,
which was typical in the past. Rather, in certain situations the truth
commission grants amnesty in exchange for a full disclosure of the truth.
V. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TRUTH COMMISSIONS
Putting aside for a moment the practical, political and theoretical
arguments for or against the use of a truth commission in Iraq, there remains
the question of whether an Iraqi truth commission would violate international
law. Several developments during the last half century reveal an "ongoing
process of (increasing) recognition of individual criminal responsibility for
grave human rights violations under international law." 144  These
developments and other advancements in the area of human rights appear to
relay the message that the era of impunity for egregious human rights abuses
141 See Jennifer L. Balint, Accountability for International Crime and Serious
Violations of Fundamental Human Rights: The Place of Law in Addressing Internal
Regime Conflicts, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 103, 108.
142 Ild
.
143 Robert Meister, Constitutions and 'Survivors Stories': Sojourners and Survivors:
Two Logics of Constitutional Protection, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 121, 151
(1996).
144 Henrard, supra note 135, at 600. The 1949 Geneva Conventions demonstrate that
certain war crimes constitute "grave breaches" under international law and demand for
individual criminal responsibility. Id. Furthermore, the 1948 Geneva Convention
confirms that genocide is also a crime under international law, to which individual
criminal responsibility attaches. Id. The 1973 U.N. Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid and the 1984 U.N. Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment provide additional bases
for recognizing individual criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity and
torture, respectively. Id. at 600-01. In light of these precedents, international law could
prove to be a significant barrier for the establishment of an Iraqi truth commission.
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is over. 145 Regardless of the benefits of truth commissions, the proponents of
truth commissions cannot ignore the fact that individuals are essentially
receiving immunity for crimes against international law. 146
International law accepts and indeed encourages amnesties in certain
situations.1 47 Amnesties are encouraged in "national" conflicts, where human
rights abuses occurred as a result of an internal, political dispute.' 48
Additional support for this idea lies in the fact that the United Nations, a
body designed to protect and ensure human rights, routinely sponsors truth
commissions in post-conflict regions.' 49 However, it is an entirely different
situation under international law when amnesty is proposed for grave
breaches of international human rights law. 150 Amnesty cannot be legally
145 Id. at 601. In 1996, pursuant to a U.N. General Assembly request, the
International Law Commission published the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind (Draft Code). The Draft Code recognizes criminal
responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and aggression. Id. at
601-02. The Tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia established by the U.N. Security
Council demonstrate further that the world is unwilling to tolerate certain behavior. Id. at
601-02. Finally, the International Criminal Court, which 139 countries ratified, is further
evidence that sovereignty and other defenses will no longer protect international villains
engaging in this type of conduct. See, e.g., Major Lisa L. Turner & Major Lynn G.
Norton, Civilians at the Tip of the Spear, 51 A.F. L. REv. 1, 33 n.187 (2001).
146 See, e.g., Death Squad Leader in South Africa Gets Amnesty, June 3, 2000, CHI.
TRB., at 12. The South African TRC granted amnesty to apartheid death squad
commander Eugene de Kock for the killings of 14 people from 1983 to 1991 in South
Africa and neighboring Botswana and Swaziland. Id.; see also Jeanne M. Woods,
Reconciling Reconciliation, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 81, 117 (1998).
147 See, e.g., Ronald C. Slye, The Legitimacy of Amnesties Under International Law
and General Principles of Anglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?, 43
VA. J. INT'L L. 173, 244 (2002).
148 See Protocol H Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Nonintemational Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 6(5), 1125
U.N.T.S. 609, 614 ("At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavor to
grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed
conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons relating to the armed conflict,
whether they are interned or detained."). The purpose of amnesty "is to encourage
gestures of reconciliation which can contribute to reestablishing normal relations in the
life of a nation which has been divided." Id.
149 See Dickinson, supra note 110, at 297-300 (Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor).
150 See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 507, 515 (1999). Amnesty is
inappropriate in situations where a grant of amnesty violates established international law
set forth in treaties and conventions. Id. For example, one main purpose of the 1949
Geneva Conventions was to prevent certain grave breaches of international law when
they arose as a part of armed conflict. Id. The Conventions did this by permitting
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granted under international law if the crimes involve grave breaches of
international law and arose out of an international conflict. 151
Thus, the Iraqi truth commission could not legally grant amnesty to
Saddam Hussein or other Iraqi leaders for the war crimes, genocide, or
crimes against humanity they committed during the international armed
conflicts in Kuwait or Iran.' 52 However, nothing under international law
would appear to prohibit the new Iraqi government from implementing a
truth commission to address the human rights atrocities members of
Saddam's regime brought upon their own people.153
The Iraqi truth commission's jurisdiction will be limited to human rights
violations waged against citizens of Iraq with political motivations. Under
international law, a perpetrator of rape, murder, or other serious crimes could
legally be granted amnesty if he committed the act against an Iraqi citizen
and it was done with political motivations. Therefore, the new Iraqi
government has significant leeway under international law to determine
which human rights violations are capable of receiving amnesty. This is a
delicate line the new government must draw, and as discussed in the
following Part, where this line is drawn could affect the perceived legitimacy
of the entire truth commission.
VI. THE PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS AS A FORM
OF DIsPuTE RESOLUTION
"Although in theory truth commissions are not antithetical to
prosecution, in most cases a truth commission report leads very rarely to
universal jurisdiction to prosecute these crimes, and establishing for the ratifiers of the
conventions an actual duty to prosecute these criminals. Id. at 515-16. Therefore,
amnesty is inappropriate in situations constituting "grave breaches" of international law
under the Geneva Conventions. Id. at 516.
151 Id. at 515.
152 See Michael Lafferty, How to Make Iraq Answer for Atrocities; Human Rights
Group Complains U.S. Misused Its Torture Reports, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 10, 1991,
at Hl, available at LEXIS, News Library, Orsent File. Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi
leaders are accused of serious human rights abuses during the Iran-Iraq war and the Iraqi
invasion in Kuwait. Id.
153 Opponents of amnesties (which would include truth commissions) maintain two
main arguments as to why any and all amnesties granted for human rights abuses are
inconsistent with international law. See Henrard, supra note 135, at 613. First, amnesties
violate a victim's fundamental rights under international law; therefore, states should
hold the perpetrators criminally accountable. See id. at 615. Second, "amnesties undercut
efforts to establish a stable democracy that honors human rights and the rule of law." See
Slye, supra note 147, at 182.
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prosecutions, even when the identity of perpetrators is known, thus
amounting to some kind of de facto amnesty."'154 States like Iraq, at the
transition point from an authoritarian regime to a democratic-style
government, are often torn on how to balance the international and domestic
pressure to prosecute with the need for national reconciliation and lasting
peace. 155 Some argue that these concepts are fundamentally at odds with one
another. 156 Whatever method a transitional state selects, a critical
prerequisite is that the mechanism is perceived by the citizenry as
legitimate. 157 The debate on which form of dispute resolution (truth
commissions or trials) is more legitimate in post-conflict states often turns on
one's perspective of the competing notions of restorative and retributive
justice.
A. Retributive Standpoint
The supporters of justice through prosecution and punishment argue that
criminal trials further "moral and political renaissance and thus open the way
for healing and national reconciliation." 158 They also believe that criminal
prosecutions deter future human rights violations by sending the message
that certain conduct will not be tolerated. 159 Additionally, trials demonstrate
a split from the old oppressive regime, which will help legitimize the new
government in the eyes of its citizens. 160 If a state fails to prosecute its
154 Henrard, supra note 135, at 632.
155 See Villa-Vicencio, supra note 18, at 209-10 (2000).
156 Hemard, supra note 135, at 632.
157 Dickinson, supra note 110, at 301. "[P]erceived legitimacy is not the formal
question of political legitimacy or democratic legitimacy that is often debated in political
philosophy or international law theory." Id. Perceived legitimacy focuses on legitimacy
in a "more on-the-ground sense," e.g., the factors that tend "to make the decisions of a
juridical body acceptable to various populations observing its procedures." Id.
158 Henrard, supra note 135, at 634. Dr. Hernard's view is that post-conflict states
usually suffer from a history of human rights atrocities. When an oppressive regime falls
and a new democratic government assumes power, that government must "reconstruct a
morally just order." Id. In these societies, many times the people living in these countries
have suffered from oppression for so long that they are unable to distinguish what is in
fact right from what is wrong. Punishing the perpetrators of wrongs can therefore lead to
a "ritual cleansing process" whereby the citizens may learn what a truly moral order is.
Id.
159 Prosecutions remind and ratify certain societal norms that people are obliged to
follow. Id.
160 Id.
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citizens' former abusers, not only might the new government lose its
legitimacy to govern, but the failure to prosecute may result in vigilante
justice.' 61
Some proponents of retributive justice for perpetrators of human rights
abuses recognize that truth commissions do bring some reconciliation to a
community and even some level of accountability for perpetrators of
international crimes; however, in their view, such a commission can never
serve as a complete substitute for criminal prosecutions.' 62 Certain people
should not escape prosecution, regardless of the purported benefits of truth
commissions.' 63 The process of punishment of the wrongdoer "bring closure
to victims of crime and their families."'164
Other commentators argue that truth commissions do not always provide
an "effective remedy" to victims.1 65 Certain international human rights
161 Id. at 634-35.
162 Christopher C. Joyner, Redressing Impunity for Human Rights Violations: The
Universal Declaration and the Search for Accountability, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
591, 610 (1998). Professor Joyner believes that, despite the documented benefits of truth
commissions, there are certain things truth commissions cannot fulfill:
Truth commissions do not produce full justice. They are not intended to. Nor will a
truth commission reveal the whole truth. But, then again, it could not have been
expected to. Reconciliation will stay incomplete, and so, too, will the hope for
justice. Forgiveness, not justice, is the price deemed necessary if a truth commission
is to help heal a society of the pain and suffering brought about by internal war and
violent ethnic strife. And this poses the crux of the dilemma: Should those who
perpetrate the most terrible of crimes escape punishment, at the price only of
admitting their guilt and showing remorse? For the experience chosen by South
Africa, the price of peace and reconciliation is "the truth" with amnesty. It is neither
justice nor compensation. How well forgiveness actually works as a strategy for
fostering political stability will only be seen in coming years.
Id.
163 Spears, supra note 129, at 157. Major Spears argues that, as a matter of policy, a
post-conflict system of justice must deny amnesty to two classes of individuals. Id. A
grant of amnesty to these classes of perpetrators "could be construed as a ratification of
their misconduct" and could damage the reconciliation process "by denying justice to the
victims of the most brutal crimes." Id. The first class is state officials responsible for the
purposeful use of weapons against civilian populations. Id. The second group is those
individuals who directly participated in state-sponsored activities "calculated to terrorize
the population of a country or engage in violations of the laws of war." Id. at 158.
164 Id. at 156.
165 Sherrie L. Russell-Brown, Out of the Crooked Timber of Humanity: The Conflict
Between South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission and International Human
Rights Norms Regarding "Effective Remedies", 26 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
227, 231 (2003). Various human rights treaties, particularly the International Covenant on
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tribunals have concluded that a victim's right to an effective remedy in cases
of gross human rights violations mandates prosecution for these abuses. 166
Under this view, truth commissions that investigate and grant amnesty to
perpetrators of gross humanitarian violations do not provide an "effective
remedy" and are therefore illegitimate. 167
B. Supporters of the Theory of Restorative Justice
On the other end of the justice spectrum is the notion of restorative
justice. Proponents of this theory of justice argue that forgiveness is a central
component to a victim's healing process. 168 Forgiveness serves as a means
for the victim to let go of "the power the offense and the offender may have
had over the victim." 169 Furthermore, forgiveness prevents a cycle of
violence and vengeance in societies with tarnished human rights records.1 70
Truth commissions serve as an effective end for proponents of restorative
justice. 171 Truth commissions focus on the needs of victims by allowing them
to speak about their suffering at hearings. 172 Evidentiary rules do not curtail
Civil and Political Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights and the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, statutorily
create a victim's right to an "effective remedy" for violating the rights enumerated in
those treaties.
166 See Raquel Aldana-Pindell, In Vindication of Justiciable Victims' Rights to Truth
and Justice for State-Sponsored Crimes, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1399, 1415 (2002);
see also Russell-Brown, supra note 165, at 228-29.
167 See Russell-Brown, supra note 165, at 261.
168 Eisnaugle, supra note 56, at 231 ("Without forgiveness, bitterness and a desire
for vengeance often hold a person captive, preventing that person from healing and thus
moving on, out of the cycle of violence.").
169 Id. (citing HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES 19-44 (1990)).
170 Restorative justice advocate Paul McCold stated, "it is important to realize that
blaming is fun. Anger is fun. Hatred is fun. And like any other pleasurable activity, it is
habit forming-you get hooked on it." Id. at 232 (quoting Paul McCold, Restorative
Justice and the Role of Community, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 85, 86 (Burt Galway & Joe Hudson eds., 1996)). McCold's point is that,
because of the addictive nature of violence, the "myth that punishment can prevent
violence rarely seems to be challenged" leading to more attempts at punishment and
further violence. Id. (quoting McCold, supra, at 85-86).
171 See Brenda V. Smith, Battering, Forgiveness, and Redemption, 11 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 921, 943 (2003).
172 Id.
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victims' testimony; therefore, they are free to express feeling and emotion as
they testify as to their suffering. 173
VII. MEETING IN THE MIDDLE: THE HYBRID PROPOSAL FOR POST-
CONFLICT IRAQ
The world has yet to see a perfect solution for addressing past state-
sponsored human rights abuse in a transitioning state. Due to the uniqueness
of every post-conflict situation in the world, such a solution is impracticable.
Oftentimes, the transition of power is a result of political compromise,
resulting in amnesty grants to former leaders. In other situations, ethnic or
religious divides are so extreme that an international body is the only
practical and legitimate way a state can address those who violated
international humanitarian law. Despite the difficulties these nations and the
international community face in addressing these atrocities, there is a global
sense of urgency to confront these criminals and protect international human
rights.
The next few years will be a significant test for the new Iraqi government
and its citizens. When the American military withdraws, Iraq will be left to
its own devices to reconcile its society and build a lasting peace inside its
borders. The challenges confronting Iraq appear insurmountable. War has
ravaged Iraq for the last few decades, leaving both government and civil
infrastructure in extreme disrepair. Iraq has an economy that has been
isolated from the rest of the world for over a decade. The country is severely
ethnically and religiously divided; therefore, the new government carries the
burden of creating legitimate government representation for Iraq's various
ethnic groups while striking a balance between the extremists and the
secularists. Despite these significant barriers to the new government's
success, Iraq must develop a solution for dealing with the thousands of Iraqis
who participated in Saddam's regime's extensive human rights atrocities.
How can Iraq reconcile its people and preserve lasting peace within its
borders? The Parts above outlined various models states have used over the
years in their efforts to obtain similar goals. Some models have been more
successful than others, and some have failed entirely. However, several
lessons can be taken from these experiments and applied to the ultimate
mechanism Iraq uses to address the criminals of Saddam's regime. Already
in Iraq, there is a push to prosecute Saddam and other high-ranking officials
of his regime. Therefore, the new Iraqi government must quickly devise a
strategy for how it intends to address these individuals.
173 Id.
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The best solution for Iraq is a hybrid mechanism involving a truth
commission and a domestic tribunal. Certain leaders of Saddam's Iraq must
be prosecuted.' 74 Saddam and others who engaged in grave human rights
violations during the Iran-Iraq war and the invasion of Kuwait cannot escape
redress. A failure to prosecute these individuals would be a violation of
international law. Moreover, members of the regime who committed human
rights atrocities not associated with political motives should also face
prosecution. Defining what constitutes a political crime will be difficult for
the Iraqi government. Does the persecution of religious or ethnic minorities
truly constitute a "political crime?" Shi'a Muslims and Kurds all suffered
tremendously at the hands of Saddam's regime, and amnesty for their
persecutors could stir extreme resentment among these populations. These
are the types of delicate considerations the government will have to make at
the formation stage.
The reality is that Iraq is infested with less significant villains of
Saddam's era. A truth commission modeled after that in South Africa would
provide the most effective means of reconciling the citizens in Iraq,
curtailing resentment, preserving the new government's legitimacy, and
fostering a lasting peace. Members of Saddam's regime will continue to live
and work amongst the victims of the persecution, and the government must
adopt a strategy that addresses the victims' needs yet understands the
delicateness of the situation in Iraq.
It seems unfathomable to grant many of these perpetrators amnesty. The
potential benefits deriving from such a commission, however, far outweigh
the arguments against its establishment. The Iraqi truth commission's
amnesty guarantee must be unconditional if (1) the perpetrators disclose the
facts and (2) their crimes were committed with political motivation. Unlike
in the South African example, where amnesty was given in exchange for
174 Gary J. Bass, At Saddam's Trial, the Law Is Just Part of the Picture, WASH.
POST, Jan. 18, 2004, at B03. Saddam Hussein, and other major Iraqi war crimes suspects,
will likely stand trial under an Iraqi Governing Council statute passed days before the
U.S. military captured Saddam. Id. The statute creates a special independent Iraqi court,
with jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by
Iraqis from July 17, 1968, until May 1, 2003. Id.
Definitions of the charges come right from the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court. The Iraqi Governing Council will pick the prosecutors and judges (who
can be non-Iraqi). Id. The statute requires that the prosecutors (who must be Iraqi) be
assisted by non-Iraqi advisers. This permits. international experts with valuable
experience from the war crimes tribunals for Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and the former
Yugoslavia to help with the investigations and ensure that these trials meet international
legal standards. Id.
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information, other states' truth commissions transferred their files to the
state's justice department so that the judiciary could investigate individual
perpetrators named in the information received by the commission. However,
the problem with mixing truth commissions and criminal trials in this manner
is that it compromises the perpetrators' incentive to come forward with their
crimes. Say, for example, the Iraqi government established an amnesty
process, which recognized five different levels of former perpetrators (based
on the severity of an individual's crimes). The top two levels of perpetrators
would be referred to the justice department for prosecution, but the bottom
three would be granted amnesty in exchange for information. This would
create a situation where many people would not step forward out of fear that
their crimes would fall into the top two tiers. This would defeat the truth
commission's primary goal because without these individual's accounts a full
and complete record of the past cannot be established.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Practical solutions to addressing human rights atrocities in transitional
states such as Iraq do not come easy. Resentment and despise for the
perpetrators of this type of violence must be tempered by a realistic view of
the state of these societies in the aftermath of conflict. A carefully structured
hybrid system of domestic trials and a truth commission could allay the fears
of many that Saddam and his men were receiving impunity while yet
facilitating the peaceful transition of power to a truly democratic state.
With Saddam in custody, and the Ba'ath Party ousted from power, the
Iraqi people finally have the opportunity to determine their own fate. 175
Public protests and demonstrations throughout Iraq in the months following
Saddam's capture indicate the majority of Iraqis yearn for a democratic-style
government with popularly elected leaders. 176
175 Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 3.
176 On January 19, 2004, nearly 100,000 Iraqi citizens rallied in the streets of
Baghdad protesting the U.S. proposal to install a provisional Iraqi government on July 1.
CNN Daybreak (Cable News Network Broadcast, Jan. 19, 2004). The demonstrators
opposed the U.S. solution, demanding instead that direct elections be held in the summer
of 2004. Id. Both the U.S. and the U.N. believed this demand was implausible, due to the
delicate situation in Iraq and the underrepresented minority groups throughout Iraq. Id.
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